Fractal world

The UK wants to leave the regional cooperation of the EU. Scotland responds by wanting to leave the "regional cooperation" inside of the UK. A similar effect, repeating the next level of scale. That is the essence of fractals.



20 July 2016

World politics - fractal characteristics

By: Karsten Riise

World politics has fractal characteristics. The same pattern is repeated on different scales.


A coastline is an object in nature with fractal characteristics. A typical rugged coast line will look the same kind of pattern (seen from above) over a wide range of different scales.

Traditionally, politics were divided into a micro-level of“politics of the state” with one set of rules and characteristics – and a macro-level“international relations”where states were viewed as identical units (billiard-ball theory) but different size as the building block of international politics. Typically, the intermediate level consisting of the political order of regions is jumped (no place for “regions” as international building blocks) and going directly from the intra-state level to the international level. Very simplistic.

On the contrary to traditional theory, the multiplex political order exhibits similar characteristics on a variety of scales.

Let me exemplify this:

On a global scale, the Multiplex world order consists of a an interaction of political units much more different in scale than hitherto theorized – going from conglomeration of state-actor units (“regions”) to single states, even some sub-states and cities with global power and down to non-state actors and super-influential individuals. So the sub-levels mix up into the supra-level of the global. This is a totally different, and most more complex, picture than traditional international theory a-lá Kenneth Waltz.

On a more “detailed” regional scale, the Multiplex regional order looks nearly exact the same as the global multiplex world order: A totality of different unlike units, from sub-regions of states, regions and cities within state playing a role on state level. Units of the “global” scale even mix directly down into the “regional” scale – making it very difficult or near impossible to keep those two level “global” and “regional” truly apart.’

The new EU will be truly Multiplex – even perhaps with a state UK of which some substate actors (England) will be outside, but other parts (Scotland) may be inside. And with the Parliament in Westminster in a truly new role which has in that form never has existed before in history. Denmark already has to manage a “realm’s commonwealth” where Greenland has its own government inside Denmark, but outside the EU, but the British experience will be a much more drastic turn.

Now going down to the “state” level – again we see the same picture as above: Sub-subentities, i.e. entities below the substate entities, mix into the multiplex state order, and again in very different non-symmetrical ways. Take the United Kingdom. Since 1700 the United Kingdom was a unitary state with only on acknowledge nationality: “British”. But since 1998, both Scotland, Northern Ireland (even with a say through an accord with another state unit, the Republic of Ireland) and Wales have through devolution got their own parliaments, even with different asymmetrical levels of competence, whereas England has no such “English Parliament”. Being British is no longer unitary – the Scotch have their own nationality, and the North Irish have special rights and duties and a totally different (very special) rule of government. We see that the Multiplex“state-level”is even interfered legally by an international level, through the Good Friday Accord of Northern Ireland in 1998, which entitles the Republic of Ireland to have a say in intra-state matters of the UK in Northern Ireland.


Regions within regions within regions....

The EU is a region... and now regions of countries are forming within the region of EU:

http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/brexit-pushes-eu-towards-multiple-unions/

Within the above regions within the region of EU... other regions form. Also this way, the new Multiplex world exhibits fractal patterns. Fractal patterns look similar across different scales of detail.


Precedence for fractal structures within social sciences

Stock-exchange prices are fractal.

If you take a historic chart of the development in the US-dollar to Canadian-dollar exchange rate (or take the price of oil, IBM shares, whatever)  - if you take away the numbers of scale of amount and time, and just look at the graph as a pattern, you cannot say if that graphic pattern you see is by month, by week, by day, by hour or by minute. The same type of fractured pattern on all levels of scale.

The political world has the same fractal characteristics.



Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


CHANGE NEWS &
CHANGE MANAGEMENT

History

30 November 2015

End of History - or Interaction of Civilizations?

By: Karsten Riise

Starting with Fukuyama

I read Fukuyama’s book ”End of History” – unlike you I found it disappointing and thin.

The fame of “End of History” is not earned by its erudition, strong argument or any deep insight, but simply by its simplistic coca-cola slogan easiness of being comprehended by a (still) dominating Western world narcissistically in love with itself and its espoused values (which may not be the same as the real values working underneath): That the Western self-conception of “liberal democracy” has prevailed once and for all.

My counter argument to “End of History” in short goes like this:

Also Fukuyama concerned himself with “identity” – however his conception of identity was ideological, in continuation of the ideological divide between liberal-democratic identity versus communist identity. I posit, that these identities are becoming less relevant – which is NOT the same as to posit that any one of them (“liberalism-democratism”) has prevailed to a degree to “finish history”.

Democracy must rightly be labeld democratism. Democratism is an “ism” just like islamism, fascism, zionism, nazism, communism, feminism, monarchism (not monarchy), etc … (finish the endless list of “isms” if you possible, as you please). In a way, these “isms” are all ideological variations of some basic themes of (1) one-person rule (monarchy/tyranny) (2) small-group rule (aristocracy/oligarchy), and (3) many-person rule (democracy/anarchy). You see – we are back to Plato and Aristotle. Readine Sabine’s “Political History”, Aristotle himself identified at least four different kinds of monarchy - this demonstrates amply, that the 3x2 kinds of rule (Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democrac and their negative variants) treated by Aristotle are just a short list – the real list goes much longer. What these two gentlemen didn’t foresee in Greece 400 BC were some later forms of rule, especially the type of rule which is today known as “Bureaucracy” (which incidentally is difficult to define as an “ism” because in spite of its ubiquity, nobody will admit to professing “Bureaucratism” as ideology – except, of course, the witty-sharp 1^st Secretary Sir Humphrey in Antony Jay’s genius BBC TV-series “Yes Minister”. Sir Humphrey persistently argues why the bureaucrats in his view are the only fit to rule, they are more clever and powerful than the politicians, and the top-Bureaucrats stay for life as the elected politicians come and go).

The point of Plato and Aristotle is that any kind of rule can be either beneficial or detrimental – depending on place, situation, practical organization, moral standards, and professional level of competence. Undoubtedly, democracy has often been optimal. Maybe it is even most of the time. But hardly ever always in all places – neither past, present, or future. Therefore, believing that democracy as “the final answer” turns democracy into democratism, a near religious belief that democracy is the final answer, just like communism and other ideologies have also been claimed to be the final answer, the end of history.

Because I am an economist, I am interested in development studies, so I studied some economic successes. Many the most astonishing economic developments have happened under non-democratic rule: France under Napoleon III. Germany under Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II. Taiwan after 1945 was ruled by the semi-fascist Guomindang one-party rule of Shang-Kai-Check. South Korea after the Korean War was ruled by a former WWII Japanese collaborator. The system of Japan after 1945, ostensibly a democracy, was (and is still probably) in reality a one-party rule. Most schocking of all, I found, that the brutal, bloody and in many ways unsavoury dictatorship of Pinochet resulted in Chile becoming probably the biggest economic (and today democratic) stable, low-corrupt, and well-functioning success in all Latin America. However, to stress my point that no type of rule is automatically ideal, the dictatorship of Videla in Argentina was largely contemporary to Pinochet, but fell exactly because it was not only bloody and unjust – it was also incompetent and running Argentina into the ground.

Going to the Muslim world, we see two ambiguities. First, we see the ambiguity of different segments of Muslim people: Many prefer democracy, many others do not. I think they ought to find out themselves. Secondly, the West, as always, wants to believe it knows best what is best for other people: So the West tries to implement democratism in Iraq, Egypt, Gaza and elsewhere. But in reality, when the People vote for the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamaz, or some Theocrats, the West renounces its own ideology of democratism, and prefers often the worst kind of dictators instead to implement Western will on Muslim peoples. As long as a dictators like the Shah, Saddam Hussein, or Mubarak serve Western interests, the West prefers to talk about democracy, but in practice the West prefers tyranny for a number of other peoples. These other people can think too – manuy of these people see naked Western hypocrisy about “democratism” as a sure recipe for oppression and catastrophe. This problem is put under the carpet by Fukuyama – Fukuyama’s talk about “liberal democracy” talking over the Earth is not to be taken seriously.

The strategist John Boyd stressed that wars a fought by humans, not by machines. Similarly, polities are run by people – not just by systems running themselves. These people may use ideologi and/or framed within the ideology of some kind of “system” (including democracy or something else), but it is not the ism that runs the polity – people do. These people may be righteous, competent, and rightly guided – or they may be immoral and incompetent catastrophies. If the ruling people are a catastrophy, including maybe the People (with capital P) itself - no system of ism – also not democratism or liberalism - can produce a good outcome.

Interaction of Civilizations

Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” is clearly the only interesting one of the pair Fukuyama-Huntington. The “Clash of Civilization” (especially the book, not the article) is simplistic – but contrary to Fukuyama it really points to a most relevant current for the Future of Security.

As mentioned above, also Fukuyama concerned himself with “identity” – however his conception of identity was along old ideological fault lines and not along cultural lines. We must, however, be open for new and emerging identity fault-lines in the Future of Security.

As the power of USA is about to become non-global, the external top-down pressure and manipulation by USA on the world’s regions (“overlay” in the term coined by Buzan & Wæver, “Regions and Powers”, 2003) will dissipate, and instead we will see how the internal security dynamics of these world-regions come up and to the fore.

I see Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” as just the first humble attempt to begin building a new regional security theory. Buzan & Wæver (2003) tried to make a comprehensive regional security theory. Some of their regional divisions are interesting, but the theory they develop is itself faulty, ill-defined and even misconceived. But at least they have tried, and Buzan & Wæver also cover some interesting ground. Your countryman Emanuel Adler even so has covered some more important ground (Adler & Barnett, Security Communities, 2000). Also we need to combine with ideas from Alexsander Wendt and even cross-check with realist concepts by Kenneth Walt.

In short, Hunting points out identities as a main dimension for regionalization of security. During the cold war, ideological identities (liberal-democracy vs. communism) were dominating, especially because these ideological identities were dominating the thinking and antagonism of the two superpowers. As Huntington points out, today other types of identities come to the fore. However, where Huntington jumps to conclusion is, when he only imagines “civilizational” identities as a “clash” between each others. Foreign Policy magazine issued a small booklet “Clash of Civilizations – the Debate” where one writer points out, that some of the worst clashes in history have happened WITHIN “civilizations” – you might call it a “civil war of civilizations” for control and supremacy within a particular civilization. So – what Huntington does NOT discuss (though he ought to have done so) is whether the civilizations he draws up will be zones of internal Peace (“Kantian” in Alexander Wendt’s terminology) or rather zones of rivalry or even enmity (“Lockeyan” or “Hobbesian” in Alexander Wendt’s terminology). We cannot say that “civilizations” are about to clash – but we do not, that they are about to become a very important fault line for interaction.

The above must be seen in the context, that economic power since 1945 has been diffusing away from USA and the West. With the long-term diffusion of economic power to Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Muslim countries comes also the difusion of the capacity to buy or produce military capabilities. With a difusion of economic and military capabilities to the world’s regions also comes increased self-assertiveness, or ambition.

We may soon discern some important fault lines or sub-divisions WITHIN civilizations (e.g. within “Islam”). We may also envisage how “civilizations” (in Huntington’s sense) can connect with each others as alliances or other peaceful super-structures of security communities (ref. Adler & Barnett) BETWEEN each others. In other words: The Future of Security will have “civilization” as ONE important parameter, geography (regions/non-contiguous country-groups) another, maybe ideology (liberalism-democratism) surviving as a third parameter – and as always the fluctuating perception of “national interest” as a fourth parameter. What we also must investigate, is the concept of “power” and “poles”. In that connection I could take as a starting point the theoretic definitions of “powers” and “poles” in different sizes by Barry Buzan.

The learning

I consider the subject of Fukuyama’s “End of History” to, if not fully, then at least to a large extend, dealt with above.

Huntington – on the other hand – has with his provocative text opened a much longer and fruitful debate about the regionalization of security and international relations. The issue of the Future of Security – the regionalization of security –  is a subject that I currently work on. As you already see in the neighborhbood of Israel, the power and relevance of USA and the West in regional security dynamics – including Syria and the Middle East - is waning. Also in Europe/Russia, Afghanistan, and East Asia we see, how USAs influence is slipping – which may result in desperate and dangerous measures from USA to hold on until a bang instead of letting go with a whimper

Finally, I may want to go against the consensus of around Walt’s security and international relations theory, and instead I might want to point out structures within the international political system that are NOT anarchical, but rather hierarchical and/or network-based. States are NOT just different sizes of plastic billard-balls, but much more complex structures linked in clusters, layers and networks.

States are semi-permeable and multi-connectional, living in a mixture of state/non-state actors. As known from metallurgy or biology, even adding a even a microscopic amount of a new thing, can create a system with radically different qualities. States are but one species of complex living biological organisms. They may be highly different on important charcteristics, and the addition of a few important non-state actors, though minor these may seem compared to the “mighty” states, can like a microscopic additive in metallurgy or a virus in biology change the whole dynamic of the international system. This is something Waltz and the academic community within foreign relations studies have never really contemplated. Biological systems are – as everyone knows – highly complex, dynamic, ever evolving, new life-forms come and go, and because of surprising feedback structures often chaotic with no static equilibrium.

Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor

CHANGE NEWS
CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Security Theory needed

23 August 2012

Europe must develop Security Theory

By: Karsten Riise

Proof of decline in US power.
Consequences to be taken.


Experts confirm USA’s decline
The world’s most influential security experts confirm a large decline in USAs power:

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security advisor (Strategic Vision, 2012) wrote a full
book to ‘revitalize’ USA and feels need to give USA a new vision at a time, where USA (if revitalized) can in best case hope to act in a limited role as an ‘enabler’ of Europe and ‘balancer’ of Asia – not alone, but in dependent cooperation with others. Brzezinski admits, that USA has lost vitality. Today, Brzezinski has given up his talk from 1997 of ‘US preeminence’ and ‘USAs unchallenged hegemony in the world’ (The Grand Chessboard, 1997). Brzezinski now even wants an alliance with Russia.

Barack Obama, US president in his Australian Parliament speech (17 Nov. 2011, far away from
European partners!) recognized that USA no longer has the force to be present everywhere. USA
wants to reduce its force-strength in Europe in order to step-up a provocative military encirclement
of China. To leave Europe and provoke China, that is what USA means, with Brzezinski words about
‘enable’ Europe and ‘balance’ Asia. Foreign Policy, authoritative magazine (The Debate on Decline, July/August, 2012). The fact that Foreign Policy magazine feels that it needs to take up a discussion about US decline is in itself a proof of US decline.

Henry Kissinger, former US secretary of state (On China, 2011, Wall Street Journal interview, 21 May, 2011) – says that USA cannot ‘contain’ China. Instead, USA must cooperate with China, and be diplomatic about ‘human rights’. USA should even cooperate with China to give over Taiwan to China. Kissinger points out, that China’s take-over as the world’s biggest lender is a turning-point in global power (CS Monitor, 28 June, 2011) Obviously, if USA had retained its old dominance, USA would never have had to be so flexible, as Kissinger suggests. Kenneth Waltz, one of world’s most prominent scholars (in Foreign Policy, July/Aug.2012) points out, that USA has no better option than to let Iran get the nuclear Bomb. The USA (in spite of the world’s biggest air-force, navy and special-forces) cannot stop Iran in a secure way. Haaretz, leading Israeli newspaper (Ignoring the Tsunami, Haaretz, 24 June 2010) already two years ago analyzed consequences of USAs decline in power.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, influential Pentagon-analyst (The World After Bush, 2011) wants (like Brzezinsky) to give at last call to revitalize USA from its decline. Thomas P.M. Barnett points out that USA is not strong enough to provoke Russia (missile-shield) and China (encirclement), drive a conflict with Iran, and at the same time still continue its global ‘war on terror’. Thomas P.M. Barnett even advices that USA should make a list of all the times USA violated the interests of other great powers (China, Russia) and make good for them! USA is a deal-breaker (Anti-Missile Treaty) where USA should long ago instead have been a deal-maker with China, Russia and the Rest-Of-World. STRATFOR, prime geostrategic analyst firm (2011) notes, that Pakistan no longer respects the power of USA.

STRATFOR long ago realized that USA needs to stop its confrontation and cooperate with Iran. A
great number of US books count the unsustainable costs for USA of its aggressive military activity, with titles like ‘Sands of Empire’ and ‘Sorrows of Empire’ and ‘The Empire Project’. The decline of USAs power, US wars as a symbolic theatre, and the creation of a multi-polar world were analyzed early by Emmanuel Todd, a French scholar (After the Empire, 2001).


Hard evidence of USA’s decline

If you think you know better than the experts above, judge the facts yourself:

Turkey in 2003 denied US access to attack Saddam Hussein from Turkish territory. This clearly
surprised USA, which already had troops on way to transit Turkey, and it forced USA to a humiliating detour of those troops. In 2010, Turkey sent its humanitarian flotilla to Gaza - another public humiliation of USA and its pro-Israel policies. Also in 2010, Turkey and Brazil (Brazil no longer obeying USAs hegemony in South America) made a separate nuclear agreement with Iran on
Uranium-fuel processing against USAs wishes.

This time, USA was humiliated for its dishonesty about making a peaceful Uranium-arrangement with Iran. Iraq revealed in Abu Ghraib 2006 USAs systematic use of torture - a US practice still silently accepted by Europe. Pakistan in 2011 and 2012 blocked vital US military land-supplies to Afghanistan for long periods. Had it not been for Russian supply-routes, European soldiers in Afghanistan had been dead. In 2001, Pakistan could be armtwisted by former US President Bush, but today Pakistan quite openly supports USAs enemies in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, even USAs own appointed puppet-leader Karzai in 2011 openly threatened to join Taliban. Egypt in 2011 saw the fall of USA’s puppet Mubarak, who was supported with US/Israeli money, torture-methods and military. Now, the year after (2012), the first fair elections in Egypt handed power to USAs arch-enemy the ‘Moslem Brotherhood’. USA tried to retain power over Egypt by letting Egypt’s US-trained generals steal extraordinary powers. But the new president of Egypt (now former Moslem Brotherhood) fired the USA-supported top-generals, and this way he took Egypt further away from USA. Ecuador (one of the weakest powers in USAs back-yard) in August, 2012 gave asylum to Julian Assange, USAs ‘most wanted enemy’.

Ecuador not only humiliates USA, but also UK and Sweden’s femi-chauvinist laws. That could never have happened in the ‘old days’ when USA played as the world’s ‘indispensable nation’ (words of US secretary of State, Madeleine Albright in 1998).

We see an enormous loss in USAs soft powers. With less cooperation and less respect, USA more has
to depend on its hard used military to achieve its global ambitions – which are still enormous.

USA is financially unsafe
With many years of public deficits up to 10% of the national income (and still no growth in sight) USA depends dangerously on China’s willingness to lend. That is what Henry Kissinger warned about with his careful words (see above) that “China is the world’s biggest lender”.

This is a ‘financial balance of terror’ between USA and China which should worry Europeans deeply.


USA - not a winner
Some people are still hypnotized by the size of USA’s air-force, navy, expansive secret service and
special-forces of 55.000 soldiers. It is a hollow, material surface. As military theorist Boyd pointed out, material overweight only comes in 3rd place after moral strength. The moral strength of USA has
become thin, and USA is not a winner on the ground.

The military failures of USA happen in parallel to failed European wars by Britain, France and
Portugal. After Europe’s ‘happy bombing’ of Libya, this is a needed warning to Europe.


USA miscalculations – a danger
The aggressiveness of US politicians shows, that America has illusions about its grandeur. For
example, illusions about USAs capability to handle any thinkable escalation against Iran, where USA
and President Obama play a high-risk game. Iran has no modern airplanes, ships and tanks, but Iran
is 5x bigger than Iraq and has nearly 2000 km of defendable coastline to the Persian Gulf. USA can
never secure Europe’s oil-deliveries from the Persian Gulf against Iranian speed-boats and coastal
missiles without putting endless soldiers on the ground. If you liked the Iraq-war, you will love Iran
(Gary Sick: Iran-U.S. need a crisis exit ramp, CNN.com 12 Jan. 2012). The many big risks includes a
regional war including nuclear Pakistan, Iranian incursions into Afghanistan, a military revolt in
Saudi Arabia and even with Turkey and Egypt against Israel. Russia may even stop NATO-supplies
to Afghanistan. A kind of World War. Maybe US politicians dream they can use some virtually nonexistent Iranian rebels as ground troops like in Libya. Good luck. This is why experts like Kenneth Waltz warn shooter-happy US politicians to face USAs limitations and let Iran in peace.
USAs politicians demand a build-up of US military activity to ‘balance’ (=press!) China. China learned from history about threats from a foreign navy, and builds capabilities to defend itself. If China sinks a US war-ship in China’s own declared sea-zone, what can USA do? Start a submarine war? Or block all sea traffic to China, thereby damaging US-owned factories in China and vital sub-supplies to USA? – and risking that China retaliates against Japanese oil-traffic from Malacca? China can retaliate by stopping new loans to USA, and send USA deeper into crisis. USA can soon become
impotent in Chinese waters, just like USA was in Russia’s flank, Georgia 2008. These are reasons
why a heavy-weight like Kissinger warns USAs politicians to face reality and cooperate on Taiwan.


United States of denial

If a 99-year has illusions that he has the strength of a 20-year, and starts a Marathon, he will risk a
physical break-down. However, the Marathon break-down the 90-year old will only hurt himself.

When a declining superpower over-estimates it own strength, it is extremely dangerous to others. And the ageing of superpowers happens quicker than ever before.

US politicians compete for harder use of US force, than what is safe. Acknowledged security experts like Waltz, Kissinger and Brzezinski warn about it – but are widely overheard.


Develop USA-independent security-solutions

USAs loss of dominance is taboo among Europe’s politicians and militaries. But the decline of USAs
power is too big to ignore, and risks to Europe are large. Europe (incl. Britain) has little influence.

Georgia in 2008 showed, that USA cannot guarantee the safety of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Not
even Poland. USAs useless missile-shield in Poland is a provocation to Russia, and reduces Russia’s
willingness to pass life-essential supplies through Russia to Europe’s soldiers in Afghanistan. USA
has made Europe morally complicit in systematic large-scale use of torture. USAs war-play against
Iran creates enormous energy-risks to Europe and China. As Russia’s president Putin once wrote:
USAs pursuit of absolute security for itself creates absolute insecurity for everybody else. USA creates unnecessary enemies around Europe’s neighborhood. After creating enemies around Europe, USA withdraws troops and nuclear capabilities from Europe for a Don-Quixote force-confrontation against China.

Former US-president Nixon wisely turned his authoritarian rival China into a cooperation partner.

Since Nixon’s opening, China lifted 550 mio. people out of poverty, and Russia is today a more attractive cooperation partner than ever since 1917. We must acknowledge that. But today, USA has
unrealistic demands and runs policies of tension against China, Russia, and Muslims. All this in spite
that USA loses superiority, credibility, and morality. The continued US pressure against Rest-Of-
World with less reason to be respected is a dangerous road. Politicians are not allowed to ignore the
red warning lamps from a worsening USA position, just because of the Euro-crisis and public debt.

To reduce debt and secure the Euro are simply necessary part-elements of an independent securitystrategy (including energy) to keep Europe safe and united.

Europe must develop its own comprehensive security-model.


Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


CHANGE NEWS &
CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Regional Theory

13 August 2012

Regional Security theory

By: Karsten Riise

With the decline of US power, world security now belongs to the regions. But the world’s regions seriously need workable theory to manage security.


Security Regions are on the rise

Since 1945, world security was very much (too much?) managed in the optic of first two superpowers, and since 1991 in the singular optic of the USA. But the USA’s preeminence on earth is now history (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision, 2012). Security thinking is not up-to-date with events.

Europe, Africa, Asia… all parts of the world, urgently need simple and workable new theory of regional security as tool for politicians, militaries, civil servants - and business people.

But! - even today’s probably most elaborated theory on regional security (exemplified by professors
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver) is a failure - read below.

I urge politicians, academics and militaries (in that order!) to give utmost priority to the development
of a useable toolbox for world regions to manage security, because the USA can no longer manage
world security -- including energy. Face the realities.


Deficits of current Regional theory

Barry Buzan, Montague Professor at London School of Economics, and Ole Wæver, professor in the
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, are probably the foremost theorizers of
regional security theory with their so called ‘Copenhagen School’. I therefore took a critical look at the Copenhagen School regional security theory, to check whether today’s most advanced theory on
regional security is of practical use.

That the world’s security needs to be divided into regions for detailed understanding is not a new
invention; geostrategist Brzezinski did it in 1997 (The Grand Chessboard). In regional security theory, three questions come up: (1) Do there exist ‘objective’ criteria to divide the world into security regions? (2) Can a security unit only belong to one region, or can it belong to overlapping regions? (3) Are security dynamics in regions well understood by experts like Buzan-Wæver?

Buzan and Wæver’s leading regional security theory disappoints in all aspects. Physics lessons in my
grammar school were often about to make observations fit to theory. Much the same experience
comes from reading Buzan and Wæver’s modern security theory Regions and Power (Cambridge,
2003) - over 564 pages.


Defining Security Regions

In Regions and Powers, Buzan and Wæver think that security regions are ‘ontological’ which is like
saying that there exist absolute objective criteria for defining which countries belong to which
region. Buzan and Wæver claim to use the intensity of ‘security interactions’ and ‘ securitizations’
(mental perception/construction of threats) to objectively define which states belong to which region.
But at the end of the day, the two professors show no quantification or documentation for the
objectivity of their choices. Buzan and Wæver’s ‘objective’ (ontological) division of the is just an
opinion that their subjectivity is more objective than the judgment of other experts. Not a good start
way to help politicians and business people.
A policy maker or analyst interested in the security of a particular object must study the full securityenvironment in a region 360 degrees around the object. It is not enough to say, that ‘‘neighbor A is a member of the security region, but neighbor B is not, therefore we do not analyze relations to
neighbor B‘‘. This means that there are multiple valid definitions of security regions, depending on
the study. The European Union must manage its security a part of different regions with  Russia/Ukraine, Turkey and the Mediterranean. Buzan and Wæver downplay Russia and the Mediterranean as not part of a European Union security complex. That is dangerous.


Overlap of security regions

Buzan and Wæver (Regions and Powers, Cambridge 2003) take the irrational ‘standpoint’ that no geographical unit can belong to more than one security region. They bring no argument for that ‘standpoint’ and their own fact-finding in Regions and Powers speaks against them.

Most embarrassing is Buzan and Wæver’s study of Turkey. The professors go a long way to claim that Turkey belongs to only one region - Europe - while at the same time in Regions and Powers they list immense amounts of security interactions of Turkey as part of a Middle East region. Turkey does
belong to more than a European security region -- that is a very important recognition in the discussion of Turkey’s possible EU-membership. Similar thing goes for Gaddhafi’s Libya: Gaddhafi was part of a Middle Eastern security region, but according to Buzan and Wævers own study Gaddhafi had very strong security interaction with sub-Sahara Africa. Therefore Libya under Gaddhafi did belong to a Middle East and a security region in sub-Sahara Africa. Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela (target of the USA) is also member of two security regions - a US-Caribbean security region, and a South American Mercosur complex. Grotesque is the claim of Buzan and Wæver, that Russia is not part of Asian regional security (long border of resource rich, thinly populated Siberia
close to China, and border to North Vietnam) or that Russia is not even part of European regional
security. Modern regional security theory misguides politicians.


Lack of actionable knowledge about Regions

Buzan and Wæver base their understanding of the security dynamics of regions on two loose concepts: Securitization (perceptions) of threats and patterns of amity/enmity. Especially fluffy becomes the idea of patterns of amity/enmity when dealing geopolitical interests, which are impersonal. More robust concepts and solid ground are needed.

Genocide is surely a security problem - mass killings have reoccurred more times since WW II. To analyse recent security history of Asia and Africa without dealing with the genocides in Kampuchea
and Rwanda is almost inexcusable. Buzan and Wæver even portray the Khmer Rouge (which murdered 1 million innocents while receiving shameful US support) as a ‘victim’ of Vietnamese
aggression. I hereby demonstrate, that even renowned security professors with political influence do
no deliver a satisfying security picture of regions. For misguided actions the politicians -- not the
professors -- will receive the blame.

In Africa, traditional tribal power-relations greatly influence modern African states. This is a central
dynamic which Buzan and Wæver in Regions and Power (typical for many scholars) superficially
describe as ‘tribal chaos’. Instead of chaos, the professors should supply insight to understand the
logics of tribal dynamics. From just a few intimate female relationships with African girls I probably
have obtained more understanding of some basic African tribal power-dynamics than two professors.
Academics simply do not understand tribes and security well enough.

In Asia, Buzan and Wæver fall into the trap of demonizing China as a threat to everybody, something
that traditional security experts Kissinger, Brzezinski and Thomas P.M. Barnett avoid. So the regional
security theorizers have a critical lack of regional insight. To remain stable, China needs to grow economically, and to grow requires vast increases in Chinese imports of energy. It is legitimate for
China to want more influence on its sea lanes (oil, trade) and to access into open ocean (blue water)
without US missile-attack submarines and aircraft carriers on its doorstep. Therefore, South China
Sea, Taiwan, the Malacca strait and Hormuz strait are legitimate interests for China. Control of East
Asia‘s sea lanes (not just for own safety) explains why India wants to militarize its Andaman Islands.
Asia has a game of classic geopolitics, but Buzan and Wæver disregard geopolitical games, so
regional security theories fail to explain Asia.

A basic idea of Buzan and Wæver is to draw a sharp distinction between ‘regional’ and ‘global’ when
looking into the regions. But states are not equal. Since 1945, the USA has developed a very advanced mix of methods (arm twisting, money, intelligence and dark operations) to make formally
sovereign states (even European) go very far to follow its wishes. For example, as civilian government takes more control, a change of Turkey’s security policies has revealed the extent of US-control formerly exerted through the Turkish military. The enormous cooperation of Egypt with Israel under Mubarak and his military, must be seen in the same light. A country’s ’own’ security agenda can be nearly impossible to separate clearly from outside influence.


Peoples and legitimacy - neglected factors

Traditional geopolitical theory (used by many western governments) overlooks people as a driving
force, and therefore they did not foresee significant developments like the ’Arab Spring’. But also the
newest security theorists like Buzan and Wæver are so distant in their treatment of people, that they
tend to forget that humans are the makers of history.

In the Algerian war, western material force controlled the territory but continually lost control to
barefoot people-power -- much like Vietnam and now Afghanistan 50 years after. After the defeat in
Algeria, a brilliant French officer, David Gallula wrote a small book with many security insights:
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London, 1964). In his book, Gallula theorized about the military importance of people. Although American militaries speak loud about taking care of civilians in Counterinsurgency (COIN), shiny US slogans like clear, hold, build have only little
theoretic learning. After an inquiry about Counterinsurgency theory at the Danish Defense Academy,
and I was shocked to discover, that NATO seems to have no comprehensive theory to guide it’s so
called Comprehensive Approach of civilian-military efforts in Afghanistan. Don’t be surprised, if
NATOs ’comprehensive’ security efforts fail in Afghanistan.

French genius Michel Foucault devoted a series of immensely well attended Collège de France
lectures in 1977-78 to investigate the relationships of Security, Territory, Population. But Foucault’s
insights have been neglected in security theory. The ground-breaking American security theorist
John R. Boyd invented the military decision cycle (OODA loop), conceptualized the F16 combat aircraft and strategized the 1st Iraq invasion for gen. Schwarzkopf. Boyd pointed out, that conflict is only in 3rd place about airplanes, ships and tanks etc, but foremost a moral test -- which points to legitimacy.

Legitimacy is not (as some believe) just a formal legality of great-power U.N. corridor deals.
Legitimacy is tied to the perception of the people groups involved. Barefoot soldiers with Kalashnikov rifles assisted by a population again-and-again out-last advanced military forces.


Western soldiers are basically employed workers.
Security theories fail, because they neglect people.

Global commons ---- water, air, cyber, space, energy - business A basic idea of Buzan and Wæver is the belief that ‘most threats travel easier over short distances’. This is untrue of water, air, cyberspace, space, raw materials (end of cheap oil), climate, business supply-market-networks and finance.

Waterways (rivers, coastal areas or blue ocean) often connect long distances. Choke points like Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca have vital security importance far away. Geopolitics must be
included in practical regional security. But the interconnection between distant regions goes a lot
further. Big companies like Mercedes-Benz, nuclear Areva or Philips, even most small companies,
depend of a huge network of sub-sub-suppliers and markets spread out on the globe. Not only exports, but also critical supply items like micro-chips - even for the defense industry - depend on
security to protect the delivery-networks covering distant regions like China and Mexico.

For money, distance no longer exists. The USA is tied up in a financial ‘balance of terror‘ with its
debt to China. As long as US-relations serve China, China will help finance the unsustainable public
deficits of the USA. When the USA fails to purchase Chinese products, or the USA screws up its
conflict-of-choice against Iran, creating a disruption of Middle East oil, a Chinese financial reaction
will sweep the foundation of public deficits in the USA.

Threats are somehow a social perception, but Buzan and Wæver fail to understand the necessity to
investigate the material foundation of threats, whether these are perceived (securitized) or not. In
fact, ‘security concerns’ are often constructed to disguise pursuits of expansion or aggression to control. To declare a ‘threat’ often serves to legitimize a want for expansion. As the nazi Göring pointed out after he was captured by the allied: Claim to be threatened in order to attack others - that
trick even works in democratic countries.


Develop a new toolbox for Regional Security

By demolishing the best existing theory on regional security, I sought to demonstrate, that there is a lack of workable knowledge to manage the vital security of regions in the post-USA era.

The systematic thinking about regional security is in disorder, and actions without solid thinking will
fail. Business, energy and the economy can only develop with secure regions. In our interconnected
world, the prosperity of every region is affected by insecurity in any other.

Practitioners urgently need better theory-tools to manage regional security -- otherwise many more
unchecked conflicts and huge losses of human lives, welfare and investments will result.

Peoples in regions live - and die - together.


Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor


CHANGE NEWS &
CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Issue of Financial Power

9 August 2011

Financial Balance of Terror

By: Karsten Riise


US stocks and financial power are going down big time these days (at the time of writing - see stock-chart figure below).

China can take tough steps that will further break down the informal empire of the USA.

Let us take a look at China's vital interests:


China needs to secure its access to Oil and raw materials

China sees, how US military controls China's security of raw-materials from the Middle East, Africa and even materials like copper from South America. From a pure military point of view, China has an interest in making the US crisis so bad, that the USA will be forced to cut down the power of US military around China.

This will be the fastest and cheapest way for China to secure a free position in relation to the USA. If China tries to build up its forces to the blown up level of US Forces in Asia, The Pacific, The Indian Ocean, The Middle East and Africa, it can cost a trillion, take many years, and the USA can easily be tempted to risk some problematic kind of military pressure on China, before China gets too far.


China mustFinanc already have recognized that USAs debt is bad value

According to China's Xhinhua news agency, China's own rating agency already degraded the value of US government papers last year. Probably 60%, or $ 1,800 billion of China's $ 3,000 billion in foreign exchange reserves are US dollar debt papers (the exact amount is a state secret). For all practical purposes, if China starts to spend these $ 1,800 billion, they will have a much smaller worth,
because market values of US debt papers will be pressed, and if spent internationally, the dollar rate will also go down. If China presses the USA with chunks of sell-outs of US government debt papers, their value will fall on the market, but that will just reflect old realities.

In fact, China's foreign exchange reserves double every 2-3 years - so why should China not buy some international freedom for all this money?


China does not depend on exports to the USA

China is strong enough to make its own internal growth. China's export to the USA was $ 365 billion, just 23% of China's total exports in 2010, according to USChina.org. Even though Chinese exports to the USA still have very high growth rates, other markets long-term have more growth-potential than the USA:


Latin-America, Asia, Africa and the Middle-East.
In order for China to be free to continue to grow, China may want to liberate itself from USAs military control of Oil and rawmaterials. The US military is even built up with money lent from China. If China accepts losses by selling out US debt papers, China can sharply increase the interest rate of US government debt, and force the USA to big military cuts. A down-turn in the USA will even make oil and raw materials cheaper. And poor Americans will need cheap products even more. Chinese exports to the USA fell 12% in 2009, but rose by a fine 23% in 2010.

A new Financial Crisis 2.0 may benefit China in many ways.


Chinese moves against USA

Last Saturday 6 August 2011, the Chinese state news agency Xinhua sent the following hard message to the USA:

".. if no substantial cuts were made to the U.S. gigantic military expenditure and bloated social welfare costs, the downgrade would prove to be only a prelude to more devastating credit rating cuts, which will further roil the global financial markets all along the way."
Xinhua, 6 August 2011

In the coming weeks, expect China to put high pressure on the USA with silent or open threats of selling out of China's US government bonds in a ways, that will break down USAs economic power. Especially, what China does not want, will be if the US national bank again prints fresh dollars to buy up US government debt in order to 'stimulate' the US stock-market (socalled 'Quantitative Easing').

Everytime the US national bank prints dollars to buy $ 600 billions of US government debt papers, then China could sell US debt papers for $ 600 billions and buy Euro, gold, Oil or African railroads and mobile phone companies instead.

If this is not enough for China, then China can sell out chunks of $ 300 billion US government debt papers. China will gain power and cheaper Oil, but also China may force the USA to let China buy US technology companies, transport and communication - and US companies will even become cheaper the more China lets the US economy sink.

The word 'globalization' will take on a whole new meaning, if China buys some of USAs most valuable companies.


A new global world

China has got its own instabilities and problems. Crisis 2.0 will also challenge China, and many things inside China can break. On the other hand, Crisis 2.0 has already started and Crisis 2.0 cannot be stopped anyway. The USA has never been afraid of putting hard pressure on other nations. Therefore, China might as well act in a tough business way to optimize its chances to get the best out of the fall of the US Empire.

It may be China's biggest opportunity in 1000 years.


Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor

CHANGE NEWS &
CHANGE MANAGEMENT