30 November 2015
End of History - or Interaction of Civilizations?
By: Karsten Riise
Starting
with Fukuyama
I read
Fukuyama’s book ”End of History” – unlike you I found it disappointing and
thin.
The
fame of “End of History” is not earned by its erudition, strong argument or any
deep insight, but simply by its simplistic coca-cola slogan easiness of being
comprehended by a (still) dominating Western world narcissistically in love
with itself and its espoused values (which may not be the same as the real
values working underneath): That the Western self-conception of “liberal
democracy” has prevailed once and for all.
My
counter argument to “End of History” in short goes like this:
Also
Fukuyama concerned himself with “identity” – however his conception of identity
was ideological, in continuation of the ideological divide between
liberal-democratic identity versus communist identity. I posit, that these
identities are becoming less relevant – which is NOT the same as to posit that
any one of them (“liberalism-democratism”) has prevailed to a degree to “finish
history”.
Democracy
must rightly be labeld democratism. Democratism is an “ism” just like islamism,
fascism, zionism, nazism, communism, feminism, monarchism (not monarchy), etc …
(finish the endless list of “isms” if you possible, as you please). In a way,
these “isms” are all ideological variations of some basic themes of (1)
one-person rule (monarchy/tyranny) (2) small-group rule (aristocracy/oligarchy),
and (3) many-person rule (democracy/anarchy). You see – we are back to Plato
and Aristotle. Readine Sabine’s “Political History”, Aristotle himself
identified at least four different kinds of monarchy - this demonstrates amply,
that the 3x2 kinds of rule (Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democrac and their negative
variants) treated by Aristotle are just a short list – the real list goes much
longer. What these two gentlemen didn’t foresee in Greece 400 BC were some
later forms of rule, especially the type of rule which is today known as
“Bureaucracy” (which incidentally is difficult to define as an “ism” because in
spite of its ubiquity, nobody will admit to professing “Bureaucratism” as
ideology – except, of course, the witty-sharp 1st Secretary Sir Humphrey
in Antony Jay’s genius BBC TV-series “Yes Minister”. Sir Humphrey persistently
argues why the bureaucrats in his view are the only fit to rule, they are more
clever and powerful than the politicians, and the top-Bureaucrats stay for life
as the elected politicians come and go).
The
point of Plato and Aristotle is that any kind of rule can be either beneficial
or detrimental – depending on place, situation, practical organization, moral
standards, and professional level of competence. Undoubtedly, democracy has
often been optimal. Maybe it is even most of the time. But hardly ever always
in all places – neither past, present, or future. Therefore, believing that
democracy as “the final answer” turns democracy into democratism, a near
religious belief that democracy is the final answer, just like communism and
other ideologies have also been claimed to be the final answer, the end of
history.
Because
I am an economist, I am interested in development studies, so I studied some
economic successes. Many the most astonishing economic developments have
happened under non-democratic rule: France under Napoleon III. Germany under
Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II. Taiwan after 1945 was ruled by the semi-fascist
Guomindang one-party rule of Shang-Kai-Check. South Korea after the Korean War
was ruled by a former WWII Japanese collaborator. The system of Japan after
1945, ostensibly a democracy, was (and is still probably) in reality a
one-party rule. Most schocking of all, I found, that the brutal, bloody and in
many ways unsavoury dictatorship of Pinochet resulted in Chile becoming
probably the biggest economic (and today democratic) stable, low-corrupt, and
well-functioning success in all Latin America. However, to stress my point that
no type of rule is automatically ideal, the dictatorship of Videla in Argentina
was largely contemporary to Pinochet, but fell exactly because it was not only
bloody and unjust – it was also incompetent and running Argentina into the
ground.
Going
to the Muslim world, we see two ambiguities. First, we see the ambiguity of
different segments of Muslim people: Many prefer democracy, many others do not.
I think they ought to find out themselves. Secondly, the West, as always, wants
to believe it knows best what is best for other people: So the West tries to
implement democratism in Iraq, Egypt, Gaza and elsewhere. But in reality, when
the People vote for the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamaz, or some Theocrats, the West
renounces its own ideology of democratism, and prefers often the worst kind of
dictators instead to implement Western will on Muslim peoples. As long as a
dictators like the Shah, Saddam Hussein, or Mubarak serve Western interests,
the West prefers to talk about democracy, but in practice the West
prefers tyranny for a number of other peoples. These other people can think too
– manuy of these people see naked Western hypocrisy about “democratism” as a
sure recipe for oppression and catastrophe. This problem is put under the
carpet by Fukuyama – Fukuyama’s talk about “liberal democracy” talking over the
Earth is not to be taken seriously.
The
strategist John Boyd stressed that wars a fought by humans, not by machines.
Similarly, polities are run by people – not just by systems running themselves.
These people may use ideologi and/or framed within the ideology of some kind of
“system” (including democracy or something else), but it is not the ism that
runs the polity – people do. These people may be righteous, competent, and
rightly guided – or they may be immoral and incompetent catastrophies. If the
ruling people are a catastrophy, including maybe the People (with capital P)
itself - no system of ism – also not democratism or liberalism - can produce a
good outcome.
Interaction
of Civilizations
Huntington’s
“Clash of Civilizations” is clearly the only interesting one of the pair
Fukuyama-Huntington. The “Clash of Civilization” (especially the book, not the
article) is simplistic – but contrary to Fukuyama it really points to a most
relevant current for the Future of Security.
As
mentioned above, also Fukuyama concerned himself with “identity” – however his
conception of identity was along old ideological fault lines and not along
cultural lines. We must, however, be open for new and emerging identity
fault-lines in the Future of Security.
As the
power of USA is about to become non-global, the external top-down pressure and
manipulation by USA on the world’s regions (“overlay” in the term coined by
Buzan & Wæver, “Regions and Powers”, 2003) will dissipate, and instead we
will see how the internal security dynamics of these world-regions come
up and to the fore.
I see
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” as just the first humble attempt to begin
building a new regional security theory. Buzan & Wæver (2003) tried to make
a comprehensive regional security theory. Some of their regional divisions are
interesting, but the theory they develop is itself faulty, ill-defined and even
misconceived. But at least they have tried, and Buzan & Wæver also cover
some interesting ground. Your countryman Emanuel Adler even so has covered some
more important ground (Adler & Barnett, Security Communities, 2000). Also
we need to combine with ideas from Alexsander Wendt and even cross-check with
realist concepts by Kenneth Walt.
In
short, Hunting points out identities as a main dimension for regionalization of
security. During the cold war, ideological identities (liberal-democracy vs.
communism) were dominating, especially because these ideological identities
were dominating the thinking and antagonism of the two superpowers. As
Huntington points out, today other types of identities come to the fore.
However, where Huntington jumps to conclusion is, when he only imagines
“civilizational” identities as a “clash” between each others. Foreign Policy magazine
issued a small booklet “Clash of Civilizations – the Debate” where one writer
points out, that some of the worst clashes in history have happened WITHIN
“civilizations” – you might call it a “civil war of civilizations” for control
and supremacy within a particular civilization. So – what Huntington does NOT
discuss (though he ought to have done so) is whether the civilizations he draws
up will be zones of internal Peace (“Kantian” in Alexander Wendt’s terminology)
or rather zones of rivalry or even enmity (“Lockeyan” or “Hobbesian” in
Alexander Wendt’s terminology). We cannot say that “civilizations” are about to
clash – but we do not, that they are about to become a very important fault
line for interaction.
The
above must be seen in the context, that economic power since 1945 has been
diffusing away from USA and the West. With the long-term diffusion of economic
power to Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Muslim countries comes also the
difusion of the capacity to buy or produce military capabilities. With a
difusion of economic and military capabilities to the world’s regions also
comes increased self-assertiveness, or ambition.
We may
soon discern some important fault lines or sub-divisions WITHIN civilizations
(e.g. within “Islam”). We may also envisage how “civilizations” (in
Huntington’s sense) can connect with each others as alliances or other peaceful
super-structures of security communities (ref. Adler & Barnett) BETWEEN
each others. In other words: The Future of Security will have “civilization” as
ONE important parameter, geography (regions/non-contiguous country-groups)
another, maybe ideology (liberalism-democratism) surviving as a third parameter
– and as always the fluctuating perception of “national interest” as a fourth
parameter. What we also must investigate, is the concept of “power” and
“poles”. In that connection I could take as a starting point the theoretic
definitions of “powers” and “poles” in different sizes by Barry Buzan.
The learning
I
consider the subject of Fukuyama’s “End of History” to, if not fully, then at
least to a large extend, dealt with above.
Huntington
– on the other hand – has with his provocative text opened a much longer and
fruitful debate about the regionalization of security and international relations.
The issue of the Future of Security – the regionalization of security –
is a subject that I currently work on. As you already see in the
neighborhbood of Israel, the power and relevance of USA and the West in
regional security dynamics – including Syria and the Middle East - is waning.
Also in Europe/Russia, Afghanistan, and East Asia we see, how USAs influence is
slipping – which may result in desperate and dangerous measures from USA
to hold on until a bang instead of letting go with a whimper
Finally,
I may want to go against the consensus of around Walt’s security and
international relations theory, and instead I might want to point out
structures within the international political system that are NOT anarchical,
but rather hierarchical and/or network-based. States are NOT just different
sizes of plastic billard-balls, but much more complex structures linked in
clusters, layers and networks.
States
are semi-permeable and multi-connectional, living in a mixture of
state/non-state actors. As known from metallurgy or biology, even adding a even
a microscopic amount of a new thing, can create a system with radically
different qualities. States are but one species of complex living biological
organisms. They may be highly different on important charcteristics, and the
addition of a few important non-state actors, though minor these may seem
compared to the “mighty” states, can like a microscopic additive in metallurgy
or a virus in biology change the whole dynamic of the international system.
This is something Waltz and the academic community within foreign relations
studies have never really contemplated. Biological systems are – as everyone
knows – highly complex, dynamic, ever evolving, new life-forms come and go, and
because of surprising feedback structures often chaotic with no static
equilibrium.
Karsten Riise
Partner & Editor
CHANGE NEWS
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
